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Improving voluntary public good provision by a non-governmental, endogenous matching mechanism : experimental evidence
Reif, Christiane; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.; Löschel, Andreas - 2014
Social norms can help to foster cooperation and to overcome the free-rider problem in private provision of public goods. This paper focuses on the enforcement of social norms by a self-introduced punishment and reward scheme. We analyse if subjects achieve to implement a norm-enforcement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010416242
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On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods : experimental evidence from the lab
Dannenberg, Astrid; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - 2010
The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003969890
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Stability and explanatory power of inequality aversion : an investigation of the house money effect
Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; … - 2010
In this paper, we analyse if individual inequality aversion measured with simple experimental games depends on whether the monetary endowment in these games is either a windfall gain (“house money”) or a reward for a certain effort-related performance. Moreover, we analyse whether the way of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003922993
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The impact of burden sharing rules on the voluntary provision of public goods
Kesternich, Martin; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - 2012
We investigate how burden sharing rules may impact the voluntary provision of a public good which generates heterogeneous benefits to agents. We compare different rule-based contribution schemes that are based on the principle of the smallest common denominator: all agents can suggest a minimum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540866
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Coordination under threshold uncertainty in a public goods game
Dannenberg, Astrid; Löschel, Andreas; Paolacci, Gabriele; … - 2011
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game …. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was … generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009374409
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On the performance of rule-based contribution schemes under endowment heterogeneity
Kesternich, Martin; Lange, Andreas; Sturm, Bodo - 2014
We experimentally test different rule-based contribution mechanisms in a repeated 4-player public goods game with endowment heterogeneity and compare them to a VCM, distinguishing between a random- and an effort-based allocation of endowments. We find that endowment heterogeneities limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405141
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Voting for burden sharing rules in public goods games
Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - 2014
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405384
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Voting in international environmental agreements : experimental evidence from the lab
Dannenberg, Astrid - 2010
different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple … majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social welfare. At first sight in line … with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008660455
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Minimum participation rules in international environmental agreements : empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations
Kesternich, Martin - 2015
Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477133
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Strategic delegation and international permit markets : why linking may fail
Habla, Wolfgang; Winkler, Ralph - 2017 - This version: May 2017
We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011685155