Showing 1 - 10 of 1,128
This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130253
Macroprudential stress tests have been employed by regulators in the United States and Europe to assess and address the solvency condition of financial firms in adverse macroeconomic scenarios. We provide a test of these stress tests by comparing their risk assessments and outcomes to those from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083085
Banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Expanding the geographic footprint of an organization's profit-making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150440
As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012761789
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003154301
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001705117
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001616716
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001486905
Although bank supervision under the National Banking System exercised a light hand and panics were frequent, depositor losses were minimal. Double liability induced shareholders to carefully monitor bank managers and voluntarily liquidate banks early if they appeared to be in trouble. Inducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129130
In this paper we revisit the debate over the role of the banking panics in 1930-33 in precipitating the Great Contraction. The issue hinges over whether the panics were illiquidity shocks and hence in support of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) greatly exacerbated the recession which had begun in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132917