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Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-And-Unwind Banks in the Us and EU Before and During the Great Recession
Carbo-Valverde, Santiago - 2011
This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130253
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Evidence of Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Mergers of Banks in the EU
Carbo-Valverde, Santiago - 2010
banks in individual EU countries help to explain the nature of cross-border merger activity. If they wish to protect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150440
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Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries
Carbo-Valverde, Santiago - 2010
EU financial safety nets are social contracts that assign uncertain benefits and burdens to taxpayers in different … develops a way to estimate how well markets and regulators in 14 of the EU-15 countries have controlled deposit … safety-net benefits for individual EU financial institutions. For stockholder-owned banks, input data feature 1993-2004 data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759547
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Incentive Conflict in Central-Bank Responses to Sectoral Turmoil in Financial Hub Countries
Kane, Edward J. - 2010
National safety nets are imbedded in country-specific regulatory cultures that encompass contradictory goals of nationalistic welfare maximization, merciful treatment of distressed institutions, and bureaucratic blame avoidance. Focusing on this goal conflict, this paper develops two hypotheses....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759699
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Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?
Kane, Edward J. - 2010
As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012761789
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Inadequacy of Nation-Based and Var-Based Safety Nets in the European Union
Kane, Edward J. - 2009
-at-risk and bank capital make it unlikely that the crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution schemes incorporated in Basel II and EU …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767381