In this paper, we propose an empirical analysis of the presence of adverse selection in an insurance market. We first present a theroetical model of a market with adverse selection and we introduce different issues related to transaction costs, accident costs, risk aversion and moral hazard. We...

Le but de cette recherche etait d'evaluer l'effet de changement de tarification de 1992 sur la securite routiere au Quebec. Nos resultats indiquent que le changement de tarification a reduit les nombres d'infractions et les nombres d'accidents, deux variables qui mesurent directement la non...

This paper tests the efficiency associated with the role of memory in long-term contracting. Bonus-malus schemes in automobile insurance are examples of contracts that use memory. During the eighties different contributors (Lambert, 1983, Rogerson, 1985, Boyer, and Dionne, 1989) showed how...

Le but de cet article est d'isoler les diterminants qui expliquent significativement les decisions de gestion des risques des entreprises non financieres. Nous appliquons le modele a des entreprises minieres en Amirique du nord. La variable aleatoire considiree est le prix de vente d'une once...

Recently, Caballi and Pomansky (1996) proposed a formal definition of mixed risk aversion and characterized stochastic dominance in presence of such utility functions. However they did not study comparative mixed risk aversion. In this note we give a sufficient condition for analytic comparative...

The goal of this study is to develop a tool to aid insurance company adjusters in their decision making and to ensure that they are better equipped to fight fraud.

In this paper we show how a shift in a return distribution affects the composition of an optimal portfolio in the case of one riskless asset and two risky assets. We obtain that, in general, such a shift modifies the composition of the mutual fund. We also show that the separating conditions...

Information problems have a large role to play in insurance markets and the regulations governing these markets were in part designed to take such problems into account. Classification variables are usually the tools used to reduce adverse selection, whereas bonus-malus (or merit-rating) schemes...

This paper analyses multi-period regulation on procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator firms.

In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts and extended by many...