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A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games

Ju, Yuan; Borm, Peter - Centre for Economic Research, School of Economics and … - 2006

To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416694

Externalities and Compensation:Primeval Games and Solutions

Ju, Yuan; Borm, Peter - Centre for Economic Research, School of Economics and … - 2005

The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636092

Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

Dimitrov, Dinko; Borm, Peter - Econometric Society - 2004

-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702645