New ways of handling incentive constraints between nonadjacent types of buyer are used to solve a monopoly screening problem. The monopoly wishes to price discriminate by designing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality, warranty, and price attributes. The multidimensionality...

This paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules. It is shown that, in many economic environments, virtually an y choice rule can be implemented. To illustrate the power of...

The authors extend E. Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--they examine the...

When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable to specify all the relevant contingencies, and so contracts are typically incomplete. This paper considers the extent to which these gaps migh t be filled by building into the contract a mechanism for revising th e terms of trade. One...

The authors introduce a class of alternating-move, infinite-horizon models of duopoly. The timing captures the presence of short-run commitment s. They apply this framework to a natural monopoly in which costs are so large that at most one firm can make a profit. The firms install short-run...

The authors provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinke d demand curve and Edgeworth cycle. In their alternating-move model, there are multiple Markov perfect equilibria of both the kinked deman d curve and Edgeworth cycle variety. In any Markov perfect equilibria , profit is...

The authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. They provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with...