Showing 1 - 10 of 13
When a decision rule is implemented using a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in which the messages are publically obser vable, the players' information is augmented by their observation of each others' strategies. In this paper the authors study the set of Bayesian implementable decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332410
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332813
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332950
This paper studies a two-period principal/agent relationship run by short-term contracts. The principal updates the incentive scheme aft er observing the agent's first-period performance. The agent has superio r information about his ability. The principal offers a first-period incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005333060
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129841
When applied to groups, the revelation principle postulates a Bayesian-Nash behavior between agents. Their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost. The authors analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129955
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130079
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130104
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702212
After a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics, a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed. A survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided, in particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231276