Showing 1 - 10 of 12
A ruler who does not identify with a social group, whether on religious, ethnic, cultural, or socioeconomic grounds, is confronted with a trade‐off between taking advantage of the out‐group population's eagerness to maintain its identity and inducing it to “comply” (conversion, quitting,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012637166
The authors introduce a class of alternating-move, infinite-horizon models of duopoly. The timing captures the presence of short-run commitment s. They apply this framework to a natural monopoly in which costs are so large that at most one firm can make a profit. The firms install short-run...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332389
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332746
The authors provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinke d demand curve and Edgeworth cycle. In their alternating-move model, there are multiple Markov perfect equilibria of both the kinked deman d curve and Edgeworth cycle variety. In any Markov perfect equilibria , profit is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332776
The authors modify the standard principal-agent model with oral hazard by allowing the contract to be renegotiated after the agent's choice of action and before the observation of the action's consequences. In equilibrium, the agent randomizes over effort levels. The optimal contract gives the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005332882
This paper studies a two-period principal/agent relationship run by short-term contracts. The principal updates the incentive scheme aft er observing the agent's first-period performance. The agent has superio r information about his ability. The principal offers a first-period incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005333060
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170354
A principal has private information that directly affects her agent's payoff (i.e., "common values" obtains). The authors analyze their relationship as a three-stage game: (1) the principal proposes a contract; (2) the agent accepts or rejects; and (3) the contract is executed. They show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702147
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702155
This paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702460