The authors consider a model where two agents, privately informed about their own characteristics, play a game on behalf of two uninformed principals. They analyze the existence of recommitment effects through public announcement of contracts in a model where agency contracts, designed ex-ante,...

It has been emphasized that when contracts are incomplete (e.g., because some relevant variables are not verifiable by outsiders), the possibility of contract negotiation may prevent achieving desirable allocations that could be implemented otherwise. The authors analyze a situation where...

The authors show in this paper that renegotiable short-term contracts can be as efficient as long-term renegotiation-proof contracts even in situations of asymmetric information. They do so by extending their earlier results on symmetric information models. Some limited commitment thus seems to...

Spot contracting generally involves efficiency losses relative to long-term contracting. It is proved here that short-term contracting and renegotiation allow to achieve long-run efficiency when transfers are not limited, objectives are conflicting, and no relevant asymmetric information appears...

The paper investigates the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria (SSE) in the vicinity of a steady state in a general, one-step forward looking economic model of dimension n. It is shown that, whenever the steady state is indeterminate, for the associated deterministic dynamics--i.e., there...