Rabin (2000) proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to general non-expected...

We present an axiomatic model depicting the choice behavior of a self-interest seeking moral individual over random allocation procedures. Individual preferences are decomposed into a self-interest component and a component representing the individual's moral value judgment. Each component has a...

This paper questions the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution. A new definition is suggested. Revisions of Nash axioms characterize the solution. The definition makes possible its extension to non-expected-utility preferences. It also reveals the logic behind the comparative statics of...

This paper shows that: (1) the "preference reversal" phenomenon can be consistent with transitive preferences if these preferences violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory and (2) for the class of experiments that were used to produce the evidence concerning "preference...

We show that in a class of I‐agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment is unnecessary, randomization has no value, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, for each agent i, we construct a simple disclosure game between the...

An important application of the theory of choice under uncertainty is to asset markets, and an important property in these markets is a preference for portfolio diversification. If an investor is an expected utility maximizer, then he is risk averse if, and only if, he exhibits a preference for...