The authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences via Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. The main result is that if there are at least three agents in society, then any correspondence that satisfies no veto power is implementable unless...

This paper studies the problem of implementation of allocation rules in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. The concept of equilibrium used is that of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The authors show that a condition called Bayesian monotonicity is...

An adaptive learning rule is exhibited for the Azariadis (1981) overlapping generations model of a monetary economy with multiple equilibria, under which the economy may converge to a stationary sunspot equilibrium, even if agents do not initially believe that outcomes are significantly...

This paper provides a fairly systematic study of rational asset pricing bubbles in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium framework that allows for incomplete markets, productive assets, borrowing limits, and incomplete participation of agents in markets. The main results are concerned with...