A principal and an agent enter into a sequence of agreements. The principal faces an interim participation constraint at each date, but can commit to the current agreement; in contrast, the agent has the opportunity to renege on the current agreement. We study the time structure of agreement...

A concept of an egalitarian solution is developed within the framework of cooperative game theory. The solution is designed to capture the interplay between social values (in this case, egalitarianism) and individual behavior. Both the final outcomes possible coalitional deviations are...

Suppose that the authors are interested in the distribution of a set of characteristics over a population. They study a precise sense in which this distribution can be said to be polarized and provide a theory of measurement. Polarization, as conceptualized here, is closely related to the...

We develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which income distributions can be described using density functions. The main theorem uniquely characterizes a class of polarization measures that fits into what we call the "identity-alienation" framework, and simultanously...

In a one-principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in...