We propose and characterize a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker prefers act f to act g if and only if <openface>E</openface>_μφ( <openface>E</openface>_πu&cir;f) &ges; <openface>E</openface>_μφ( <openface>E</openface>_πu&cir;g), where <openface>E</openface> is the expectation operator, u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, φis an increasing transformation, and μis a...

We axiomatize preferences that can be represented by a monotonic aggregation of subjective expected utilities generated by a utility function and some set of i.i.d. probability measures over a product state space, S-super-∞. For such preferences, we define relevant measures, show that they are...