Showing 1 - 10 of 10
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The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on richer type spaces. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231583
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216117
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008470809
The authors consider a single consumer buying a stream of goods from different sellers over time. The true value of each seller's product is initially unknown. Additional information is obtained by experimentation. For exogenous prices, this is a multiarmed bandit problem. The innovation here is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130123
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231346
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216137
'No trade' theorems have shown that new information will not lead to trade when agents share the same prior beliefs. This paper explores the structure of no trade theorems with heterogeneous prior beliefs. It is shown how different notions of efficiency under asymmetric information--ex ante,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699924
A number of papers have shown that a strict Nash equilibrium action profile of a game may never be played if there is a small amount of incomplete information. The authors present a general approach to analyzing the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information. A Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699936
This paper elucidates on the logic behind recent papers which show that a unique equilibrium is selected in the presence of higher order uncertainty, i.e., when players lack common knowledge. We introduce two new concepts: stochastic potential of the information system and p-dominance of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702418