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A theory advanced in regulatory hearings holds that market performance will be improved if one side of the market is forced to publicly reveal preferences. For example, wholesale electricity producers claim that retail electricity consumers would pay lower prices if wholesale public utility...
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Evidence suggests that individuals often comply with regulations even though the frequency of inspections and audits is low. We report a laboratory experiment based on the dynamic model suggested by Harrington (1988) to explain this puzzle in which participants move between two inspection groups...
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"This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a "collusion incubator" environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005024178
"The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a "collusion incubator" environment based on a type of public, symmetrically "folded" and "item-aligned" preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005024182