Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable $\theta $ and have to decide how much effort to devote to collect private information and consequently how much to rely on public information. The latter is just a noisy average of past predictions. It is shown that costly information...

We consider a set-up in which firms sequentially adopt a technology. The technology is a public good. Late movers, upon observing the early movers adopting the old technology, (partly) infer that the new technology does not exist. This hampers their incentives to innovate. Early movers...

Recent experiments on mixed-strategy play in experimental games reject the hypothesis that subjects play a mixed strategy even when that strategy is the unique Nash equilibrium prediction. However, in a three-person matching-pennies game played with perfect monitoring and complete payoff...

This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes׳ rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each...

We develop in this paper a novel portfolio selection framework with a feature of double robustness in both return distribution modeling and portfolio optimization. While predicting the future return distributions always represents the most compelling challenge in investment, any underlying...

We explore a New Keynesian Model with diverse beliefs and study the aggregation problems in the log-linearized economy. We show the solution of these problems depend upon the belief structure. Agents' beliefs are described by individual state variables and satisfy three Rationality Axioms,...

Based on the axiomatic framework of Choquet decision theory, we develop a closed-form model of Bayesian learning with ambiguous beliefs about the mean of a normal distribution. In contrast to rational models of Bayesian learning the resulting Choquet Bayesian estimator results in a long-run bias...

The dynamics of a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship is studied. The agent's type remains the same over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the agent after the first period into account. <p>Compared to...</p>

The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments...