The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to … auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the … number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism …

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at …

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from …

while nurturing the supporting on-shore infrastructure. This paper discusses the design of auctions for wind rights in which … price is the sole factor of competition. A second paper, Ausubel and Cramton (2011), extends the analysis to auctions in …

The present invention primarily concerns hybrid auctions that may, for example, combine a clock auction with a proxy … auction. Hybrid auctions include multi-item auctions that comprise at least two phases of package auctions: an earlier phase …

CCA to spectrum auctions have tended to place most or all reliance on a monotonicity condition in eligibility points. This …