The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …

This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …

Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to … auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the … number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism …

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from …

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at …

We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules … market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. Both the HRB and LAB auctions maximize revenues …