We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played simultaneously by the entire population. In these games payoffs, and hence best replies, are determined by a summary statistic of the population strategy profile. We...

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In...

In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of such a game.

For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail to do so, and (ii)...

The paper shows that, with any rationing mechanism between the efficient and proportional extremes, the Kreps-Scheinkman two-stage quantity-price game reduces to the Cournot model if demand is uniformly elastic and if all costs are sunk at the first stage, thus providing positive results to set...

In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very typical and somewhat general...

We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity. Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be rationed if the number of applicants...

Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the...

We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions...

We consider static non-cooperative games with a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend on their own actions and finitely many summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies without any convexity restrictions on payoffs...