We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) in which some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive...

We study a model where investment decisions are based on investor’s information about the unknown and endogenous return of the investment. The information of investors consists of endogenously determined messages sold by financial analysts who have access to both public and private information...

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1976</CitationRef>) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...</citationref>

We consider a set of asymmetrically informed agents, where the information of each trader is susceptible of being altered when she becomes a member of a coalition. For this, we consider a general rule that depending on the coalition, a signal (or an information partition) is assigned to each...

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use our results...

We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric information. The model generalizes the Rothschild-Stiglitz pure adverse selection problem by including moral hazard. Entrepreneurs with unequal “abilities” borrow to finance alternative...

We propose a version of Townsend’s [17] model of costly audits where the agents’ types are correlated. Audits are used because agents have a limited ability to bear risk so that the Full Surplus Extraction (FSE) scheme á la Crémer and McLean [5,6] and McAfee and Reny [13] are suboptimal....

We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their...