Showing 1 - 8 of 8
We study a two periods model of incomplete markets with nominal assets unsecured by collateral, where agents can go bankrupt but there are no bankruptcy penalties entering directly in the utility function. We address two cases: first, a proportional reimbursement rule under bounded short sales...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753223
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596772
This paper shows new properties about the equilibria of a stationary OG economy by establishing a connection between its stationary equilibria and those of a finite economy, with and without extrinsic uncertainty. Specifically, it shows the countability and local uniqueness with respect to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370896
A speculative security is an asset whose payoff depends in part on a random shock uncorrelated with economic fundamentals (a sunspot) about which some traders have superior information. In this paper we show that agents may find it desirable to trade such a security in spite of the fact that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371082
The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private information, and the incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371166
This paper analyzes intertemporal seller pricing and buyer purchasing behavior in a laboratory retail market with differential information. A seller posts one price each period that a buyer either accepts or rejects. Trade occurs over a sequence of "market periods" with a random termination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147334
We study the process of learning in a differential information economy, with a continuum of states of nature that follow a Markov process. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically, i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178705
A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753202