This note investigates the effects of introducing a transaction tax ondepth and bid-ask spread using a static model where a competitive market makerfaces informed and liquidity traders. When the degree of information asymmetryis low, an increase in the transaction tax can result into a smaller...

The Rubinstein and Wolinsky bargaining-in-markets framework is modified by the introduction of asymmetric information and non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is introduced in the form of an arbitrary stochastic Markov process which captures the dynamics of market entry and pairwise matching. A...

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment...

The aim of this paper is to study the design of optimal capital structure of a "large" intermediary when the intermediary faces a non-diversifiable risk, within the standard costly-state-verification (CSV) model. I demonstrate that, under weaker conditions, a "large" intermediary realizes more...

We provide a characterization of participants' behavior in a contest or tournament where the marginal productivity of effort varies across contestants and individual productivity is private information. We then consider the optimal design of such a contest. <p>We first analyze contestant behavior...</p>

We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who...