This paper shows the robust non-existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a sophisticated and naive representative agent. Even when underlying preferences are monotone and...

In a model with a nonatomic continuum of traders some of which behave strategically while the others remain price-takers, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria coincides with the set of Walras equilibria. This property is no longer valid when the strategic agents are represented by atoms.

In this paper, we show that, in markets with a continuum of traders and atoms, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria may be disjoint. We show also that, when the preferences of the traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the set of...

A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize...