Showing 1 - 10 of 45
This paper studies `knockout' auctions, typically organized by bidding rings, in which the winning bidder makes side … unbiased estimates of the item's price in the absence of collusion. This paper evaluates the extent of this overestimate in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370751
We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753268
Collusion is a serious problem in many procurement auctions. In this research, I study a model of first price sealed … bid procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. I demonstrate that the equilibrium to the model is unique and describe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753262
Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to … auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the … number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753320
We model credit contracting and bidding in a first-price sealed-bid auction when bidder valuation and wealth are private information. An efficient separating equilibrium exists only if the wealth levels of both bidder types are sufficiently different. If not, high-valuation bidders signal by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155391
This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370851
This paper considers a model in which bidders in an auction are faced with uncertainty as to their final valuation of the auctioned object. This uncertainty is resolved after the auction has taken place. It is argued that the inclusion of a cooling-off right raises the expected revenue to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753123
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753368
We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim … are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed …. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Copyright Springer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753378
We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects, namely, an English and a Japanese auction, and derive a … consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Thus an equilibrium of a continuous time game is derived by means of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596770