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A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority … strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain …
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both U and MEW but is weaker than Condorcet-consistency (CON)—it is the only direct mechanism scoring rule that is …
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ranked at the top. We also calculate the maximum number for rules that satisfy the Pareto criterion, but not the Condorcet … criterion, and for rules that satisfy the Condorcet criterion, but not the Pareto criterion. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993545
A no-show paradox occurs each time a single voter or a group of voters can manipulate the outcome by not participating to the election process. Among other voting procedures, the scoring run-off methods, which eliminate progressively the alternatives on the basis of scoring rules, suffer from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596676