We present an axiomatization of expected utility from the frequentist perspective. It starts with a preference relation on the set of infinite sequences with limit relative frequencies. We consider three axioms parallel to the ones for the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vN–M) expected utility...

We consider the problem of fairly dividing <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$l$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> divisible goods among <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity,...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>

We consider a situation in which a central authority must allocate non-tradeable and non-marketable goods between a group of individuals in a fair way. There are exogenous divisibility constraints imposed on the goods to be allocated. The authority has absolutely no information on the...

In an incomplete information, common values setting with risk-neutral agents, we consider mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership where the mechanism designer has no information about the distribution of signals of the agents. We find that the divide and choose mechanism...