We model constitutions by effectivity functions. We assume that the constitution is common knowledge among the members of the society. However, the preferences of the citizens are private information. We investigate whether there exist decision schemes (i.e., functions that map profiles of...

Solutions defined on classes of strategic games, satisfying One-Person Rationality (OPR), Non-emptiness (NEM) and Consistency (CONS) are considered. The main question to be answered is whether these conditions characterize the Nash Equilibrium solution NE for the given class of games. Depending...

Solutions defined on classes of strategic games, satisfying One-Person Rationality (OPR), Non-emptiness (NEM) and Consistency (CONS) are considered. The main question to be answered is whether these conditions characterize the Nash Equilibrium solution NE for the given class of games. Depending...

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$x$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>x</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$y$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>y</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered where the information is released over infinite time. The strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption streams that can be improved upon by no coalition at no moment of time. Non-emptiness of the strong...

We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and...

The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of...