We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives when monetary transfers are possible. In this context, Schummer (2000) shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manipulation through bribes is ruled out. But he requires two kinds of domain-richness...

The standard of living of an agent is viewed as her capability of achieving various functionings (Sen, 1985, 1987). The agent is thus characterized by her capability set that consists of different functioning vectors. The task of measuring the standard of living of the agent formally is...

We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are...

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$x$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>x</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$y$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>y</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>