We model credit contracting and bidding in a first-price sealed-bid auction when bidder valuation and wealth are …

-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash … characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction. …

overwhelm the central computer. This paper explores the use of a computation procuring clock auction to induce human agents to … approximate the solutions to discrete constrained optimization problems. Economic and computational properties of the auction are … studied through a series of laboratory experiments. The experiments are designed around a potential application of the auction …

I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient … undominated ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for … every auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 …

in an identical public auction. As a consequence, neither the realized price nor the total payments of the winner are … independent private values case, for first and second price post-auction knockouts. Bids are not independent of the sharing rule … but transfers from the winning bidder are. Further, bidder payoffs are independent of both the auction format and the …

Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to … some probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction …

information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their … bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only … efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these …

This paper considers a model in which bidders in an auction are faced with uncertainty as to their final valuation of … the auctioned object. This uncertainty is resolved after the auction has taken place. It is argued that the inclusion of a … that owning the object incurs negative utility to the winner of the auction. The model is then tested in a laboratory …