We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice, given a plausible dominance property that...

This note extends Gorman's [1959] classic result on two-stage budgeting to encompass the two-group cases that he assumed away. The proof, which exploits unpublished and recently published results not available to Gorman in 1959, makes it apparent that the entire structure needed for two-stage...

We provide characterizations of four new rules for individual decision-making under complete uncertainty. They are what we call the min-max rule, the max-min rule, the lexicographic min-max rule and the lexicographic max-min rule. These rules provide orderings of the sets of possible outcomes...

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given...

In this note, it is shown that a result due to Uzawa showing that the weak axiom of revealed preference together with a regularity condition implies the strong axiom of revealed preference can be derived from the regularity condition alone, if the choice function is continuous in prices and in...