We characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies 'unanimity'...

In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's Method is designed to find the candidate that is "closest" to being a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we show that the winner from Dodgson's Method can occur at any position in the ranking obtained from the Borda Count, the plurality method,...

We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives when monetary transfers are possible. In this context, Schummer (2000) shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manipulation through bribes is ruled out. But he requires two kinds of domain-richness...

If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y).

A social welfare function for a denumerable society satisfies Pairwise Computability if for each pair (x,y) of alternatives, there exists an algorithm that can decide from any description of each profile on {x,y} whether the society prefers x to y. I prove that if a social welfare function...

Simple majority voting between pairs of alternatives is used to aggregate individual preferences. The occurence of Condorcet cycles is limited thanks to a principle of homogeneity on individual preferences. The restrictions induced on the domain of the latters are weak: among the n! possible...

This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number...

This note provides two necessary and sufficient conditions for the relative interior of the core (and the base polyhedron) to be non-empty: (i) the second largest excess of the prenucleolus is negative; (ii) the grand coalition's payoff is greater than the minimum no-blocking payoff. Such...

We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and...

We investigate the existence of consistent rules for the resolution of conflicting claims that generalize the Talmud rule but do not necessarily satisfy equal treatment of equal. The first approach we follow starts from the description of the Talmud rule in the two-claimant case as...