Most of the literature argues that competitive analysis has nothing interesting to say about location. This paper argues, to the contrary, that a competitive model can have something interesting to say about location, provided that locations are not identical and transportation costs are not...

In many online systems, individuals provide services for each other; the recipient of the service obtains a benefit but the provider of the service incurs a cost. If benefit exceeds cost, provision of the service increases social welfare and should therefore be encouraged—but the individuals...

Much of the lending in modern economies is secured by some form of collateral: residential and commercial mortgages and corporate bonds are familiar examples. This paper builds an extension of general equilibrium theory that incorporates durable goods, collateralized securities, and the...

Fifty years ago Arrow [1] introduced contingent commodities and Debreu [4] observed that this reinterpretation of a commodity was enough to apply the existing general equilibrium theory to uncertainty and time. This interpretation of general equilibrium theory is the Arrow-Debreu model. The...

We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t=0,1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria...

General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numÊraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences...

We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders' utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price...

A premise of general equilibrium theory is that private goods are rival. Nevertheless, many private goods are shared, e.g., through borrowing, through co-ownership, or simply because one person’s consumption affects another person’s wellbeing. I analyze consumption externalities from the...

In the theory of economies with public goods, one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem...

In large games with transferable utility, core payoffs satisfy a comparative statics property: If the proportion of one type of player increases, then the core payoff to that type of player decreases (does not increase). Markets with transferable utility satisfy a similar property: if the...