The monetary character of trade, use of a common medium of exchange, is shown to be an outcome of an economic general equilibrium. Monetary structure can be derived from price theory in a modified Arrow-Debreu model. Two constructs are added: transaction costs and market segmentation in trading...

I study a version of the Williamson-Wright (1994) model that results from ruling out direct barter. Although one can no longer argue that the value of money comes exclusively from private information, one can use the simplified model to address a variety of other issues. In particular, one can...

We build a one-period general equilibrium model with money. Equilibrium exists, and fiat money has positive value, as long as the ratio of outside money to inside money is less than the gains to trade available at autarky. We show that the nominal effects of government fiscal and monetary policy...

Gold and tobacco have both been used as commodity money. One difference between the two is that gold yields utility, on account of its beauty, without diminishing its quantity. Tobacco yields utility when it is consumed. If this were the only difference, Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...

We consider a monetary growth model essentially identical to that of Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), except that we explicitly model credit markets, a credit market friction, and an allocative function for financial intermediaries. These changes yield substantially different results than those...

I provide new results concerning dynamics for a version of the Kiyotaki-Wright model (1989) in which strategies (either mixed or pure) are restricted so that agents play the same strategy for each opportunity set. My results demonstrate the importance of examining stability in such models,...

This paper examines the relationship between specialization and the use of money in two versions of the search-theoretic monetary model. The first version establishes a surprising result that specialization is more likely to occur in a barter economy than in a monetary economy. The result is...

We analyze a pure bargaining problem when decisions require simple majority and self interested players make unilateral demands. In contrast to the case where proposals consist of complete sharing profiles, this content of proposals prevents implicit side-payments inside the committee, and so...

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin...

For a two-sided multipartner matching model where agents are given by path-independent choice functions and no quota restrictions, Blair [7] had shown that stable matchings always exist and form a lattice. However, the lattice operations were not simple and not distributive. Recently Alkan [3]...