In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$x$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>x</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$y$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>y</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of the...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered where the information is released over infinite time. The strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption streams that can be improved upon by no coalition at no moment of time. Non-emptiness of the strong...

We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and...

The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of...

We provide characterizations of four new rules for individual decision-making under complete uncertainty. They are what we call the min-max rule, the max-min rule, the lexicographic min-max rule and the lexicographic max-min rule. These rules provide orderings of the sets of possible outcomes...

We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice, given a plausible dominance property that...

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given...

In this note, it is shown that a result due to Uzawa showing that the weak axiom of revealed preference together with a regularity condition implies the strong axiom of revealed preference can be derived from the regularity condition alone, if the choice function is continuous in prices and in...