We study the welfare effects of different types of pre-arrangements (as identified in Sönmez in J Econ Theory 86:148–156, <CitationRef CitationID="CR25">1999</CitationRef>) under the intern-optimal and hospital-optimal stable mechanisms in matching markets. First, both mechanisms are manipulable via Type-2 pre-arrangements. Regarding...</citationref>

We consider a non-cooperative assignment model where we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium is stable, and that an appropriate refinement criterion leads to the p-optimal outcome. We then consider a model with reneging and derive some interesting properties of this game. We show that in...

This paper presents sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and globally stable steady state equilibrium for OLG economies with production. The conditions impose separate requirements on the utility and production functions. Moreover, the conditions do not require assumptions...