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Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Schmitz, Patrick - In: Economic Theory 37 (2008) 2, pp. 307-320

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596772

Bancruptcy in a model of unsecured claims

Páscoa, Mário R.; Araujo, Aloisio P. - In: Economic Theory 20 (2002) 3, pp. 455-481

We study a two periods model of incomplete markets with nominal assets unsecured by collateral, where agents can go bankrupt but there are no bankruptcy penalties entering directly in the utility function. We address two cases: first, a proportional reimbursement rule under bounded short sales...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753223

Auctions with costly information acquisition

Crémer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles - In: Economic Theory 38 (2009) 1, pp. 41-72

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370693

Auctions of licences and market structure

Rodriguez, Gustavo E. - In: Economic Theory 19 (2002) 2, pp. 283-309

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to participate in a symmetric market game. Assuming that the rate at …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370851

When and why not to auction

Campbell, Colin; Levin, Dan - In: Economic Theory 27 (2006) 3, pp. 583-596

Standard auctions are known to be a revenue-maximizing way to sell an object under broad conditions when buyers are … symmetric and have independent private valuations. We show that when buyers have interdependent valuations, auctions may lose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370996

Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

Ausubel, Lawrence; Cramton, Peter - In: Economic Theory 23 (2004) 3, pp. 493-505

We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of private information, and then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371037

Contests with rank-order spillovers

Baye, Michael; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper - In: Economic Theory 51 (2012) 2, pp. 315-350

class of games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993551

First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders

Virág, Gábor - In: Economic Theory 52 (2013) 1, pp. 129-163

We study first-price auctions with resale when there are many bidders and derive existence and characterization results … distributions are between strong and weak bidders. We also show in an example that the revenue advantage of first-price auctions … over second-price auctions is positive, but decreasing in the number of bidders. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993565

Auctions with cross-shareholdings

Dasgupta, Sudipto; Tsui, Kevin - In: Economic Theory 24 (2004) 1, pp. 163-194

We study the effect of cross-shareholding among two competing firms on their bidding behavior and the expected sales revenue for the seller in an auction environment. The bidders’ private signals are independent, and the model encompasses the private values model and a particular common value...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596651

An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective

Malakhov, Alexey; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Economic Theory 39 (2009) 1, pp. 113-128

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596691