A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority … strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain …

parties are expected plurality maximizers and that voters satisfy a version of the sincere voting assumption adapted to this …

Approval voting is designed to be "insensitive to numbers" of voters, and likely to elect a Condorcet candidate … election, or a Condorcet candidate could finish last. …

including all its cyclic permutations (“Condorcet cycles”). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It …

characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting … does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively … related to the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the …

to the election process. Among other voting procedures, the scoring run-off methods, which eliminate progressively the …

A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that … these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari …