We consider <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$H$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>H</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$X\in {\mathbb {R}}^{N}$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>X</mi> <mo>∈</mo> <msup> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="double-struck">R</mi> </mrow> <mi>N</mi> </msup> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and address the following two questions: does efficient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

This paper exhibits a duality between the theory of revealed preference of Afriat and the housing allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf. In particular, it is shown that Afriat’s theorem can be interpreted as a second welfare theorem in the housing problem. Using this duality, the revealed...

In a situation where agents have private information, we investigate the stability of mechanisms with respect to coalitional deviations. In the cooperative tradition, we first extend the notion of Core, taking into account the information a coalition may have when it forms and the conjectures of...