We develop an index theory for the Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP) equilibrium set in a class of n-player <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$(n\ge 2)$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> sequential bargaining games with probabilistic recognition rules. For games with oligarchic voting rules (a class that includes unanimity rule), we establish conditions on...</equationsource></inlineequation>

In this paper, I examine a two-period general equilibrium model in which transaction costs are incurred whenever financial contracts are traded. These transaction costs are real and convex. The presence of these transaction costs results in a Pareto inefficient equilibrium allocation. Attempting...

This paper studies a sole proprietorship economy with imperfect competition in a transferable utility setting. While consumers behave as price takers, producers issue real assets strategically to maximize their own utility. Even when complete markets are technologically feasible, equilibria with...