Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts...

A very general result on continuous linear representability of binary relations on topological vector spaces is presented. Applications of this result include individual decision making under uncertainty, i.e. expected utility theory and collective decision making, in particular, utilitaristic...

The paper presents an alternative short proof for the linear utility representation theorem. In particular a generalization of the theorem of Blackwell and Girshick (l954) and a special case of the theorem of Herstein and Milnor(1953) are proved by exploiting the topological group structure of...

The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of $n$-person bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash...