The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for transferable utility (TU) games with coalition structure as well as the consistent...

This paper deals with a private ownership production economy assuming that the commodity space is infinite-dimensional. It is first showed that the fuzzy core allocations, a concept that goes back to J.-P. Aubin, are in a one-to-one correspondence with certain core allocations of a continuum...

For a two-sided multipartner matching model where agents are given by path-independent choice functions and no quota restrictions, Blair [7] had shown that stable matchings always exist and form a lattice. However, the lattice operations were not simple and not distributive. Recently Alkan [3]...

A simple proof of Reny and Wooders' recent strengthening of Shapley's extension of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma on a closed cover of a simplex is given. The proof uses Ky Fan's coincidence theorem.

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

It is shown that core-Walras equivalence fails whenever the commodity space is a non-separable Banach space. The interpretation is that a large number of agents guarantees core-Walras equivalence only if there is actually a large number of agents relative to the size of the commodity space....

Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategy-proofness and...

A condition is given that is equivalent to balancedness of all NTU-games derived from an exchange economy with asymmetric information when endowments are variable. The condition is applicable to the ex-ante model with expected utilities, but also to the more general model of Arrow-Radner type...

The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private information, and the incentive compatible...

By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition being a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. It is well-known that balancedness is a...