Showing 1 - 10 of 124
level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players …’ resources are “use it or lose it” in the sense that any resources that are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993605
A simple proof of Reny and Wooders' recent strengthening of Shapley's extension of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma on a closed cover of a simplex is given. The proof uses Ky Fan's coincidence theorem.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370919
-life contests. We propose a model where the principal of a contest has commitment power to verifiably disclose contestants’ types …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014497469
I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753391
We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753268
Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753333
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370806
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370924
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596764
We analyze the strategic allocation of resources across two contests as in the canonical Colonel Blotto game. In the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011151150