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We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753268
An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem is given involving only Brouwer's fixed point theorem and some elementary calculus. A function is explicitly given such that a fixed point of it yields an intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing weights....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753283
A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753323
This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753448
. It is well-known that balancedness is a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of such a cooperative non … game theory in dealing with economic or political problems. Next we define the concept of core for such games. By … introducing balancedness for ordered partitions of coalitions, we prove the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596678
The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of $n$-person bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596761
Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596804
communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597875
In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1976</CitationRef>) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993544
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010557783