This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some...

Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 6:58–73, <CitationRef CitationID="CR22">1981</CitationRef>) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main findings....</citationref>

By a slight generalization of the definition of implementation (called implementation by awards), Maskin monotonicity is no more needed for Nash implementation. In fact, a weaker condition, to which we refer as almost monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient for social choice...

The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is...