We examine an infinitely repeated principal agent game without discounting (Radner [1985]), in which the agent may engage in multiple projects. We focus on "linear" strategies that summarize each history into a linear function of public outcomes, and select an action according to a single...

We examine an infinitely repeated principal agent game without discounting (Radner [1985] ), in which the agent may engage in multiple projects. We focus on "linear" strategies that summarize each history into a linear function of public outcomes, and select an action according to a single...

The perfect folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) need not rely on excessively complex strategies. We recover the perfect folk theorem for two person repeated games with discounting through neural networks (Hopfield, 1982) that have finitely many associative units. For any individually...

We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and the...

This paper examines implications of complexity cost in implementing repeated game strategies through networks with finitely many classifiers. A network consists of individual classifiers that summarize the history of repeated play according to a weighted sum of the empirical frequency of the...