A single condition, limited arbitrage, is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in economies with any number of markets, finite or infinite, with or without short sales. This extends earlier results of Chichilnisky for finite economies....

We prove the existence and efficiency of equilibrium in economies with infinitely many consumers in which there are finitely many agents who own a positive portion of the aggregate endowment. We prove existence for commodity spaces which are employed in the general equilibrium asset pricing...

Bewley's condition on production sets, imposed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium price density when $L^{\infty}$ is the commodity space, is weakened to allow applications to continuous-time problems, and especially to peak-load pricing when the users' utility and production functions are...

This paper demonstrates global stability of a competitive equilibrium in a multi-sector model of many firms, each of which exhibits constant returns to scale technology, and of infinitely lived consumers, whose preferences are recursive but not necessarily additively separable. In the topology...

This paper proves core-equivalence theorems for exchange economies without ordered preferences, defined on locally convex Riesz commodity spaces such that the price space is a lattice. Properness assumptions are borrowed from some recent equilibrium existence results.

Contrary to the finite dimensional set-up, the hypothesis of an atomless measure space of traders does not entail convexity of aggregate demand sets if there are infinitely many commodities. In this paper an assumption is introduced which sharpens the non-atomicity hypothesis by requiring that...

I provide new results concerning dynamics for a version of the Kiyotaki-Wright model (1989) in which strategies (either mixed or pure) are restricted so that agents play the same strategy for each opportunity set. My results demonstrate the importance of examining stability in such models,...

The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of $n$-person bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash...