An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by clients. As a result, names are traded in all...

For perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and one with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over to a particular form of...

Evidence is adduced that the sages of the ancient Babylonian Talmud, as well as some of the medieval commentators thereon, were well aware of sophisticated concepts of modern theories of risk-bearing. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

In an oligopoly game with cost uncertainty and risk averse firms, we show that Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium have different convergence properties when the market is replicated. The Cournot equilibrium price converges to the competitive price. Under very typical and somewhat general...

This paper presents a model of a Walrasian exchange economy in which the preferences and endowments of the agents are random. Stochastic interaction among the agents is formally described in terms of dependency neighborhoods. The main result is a characterization of the distribution of...

The aim of this paper is to develop some measure-theoretic methods for the study of large economic systems with individual-specific randomness and multiple optimal actions. In particular, for a suitably formulated continuum of correspondences, an exact version of the law of large numbers in...

This paper obtains finite counterparts of previous results that showed the informational efficiency of the Walrasian mechanism among all mechanisms yielding Pareto-optimal individually rational trades in exchange economies while using a continuum of possible messages. In particular, we develop...