We consider <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$H$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>H</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$X\in {\mathbb {R}}^{N}$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>X</mi> <mo>∈</mo> <msup> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="double-struck">R</mi> </mrow> <mi>N</mi> </msup> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and address the following two questions: does efficient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

This paper exhibits a duality between the theory of revealed preference of Afriat and the housing allocation problem of Shapley and Scarf. In particular, it is shown that Afriat’s theorem can be interpreted as a second welfare theorem in the housing problem. Using this duality, the revealed...