Showing 1 - 10 of 33
We characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies 'unanimity'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012581952
Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity. This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskin's, dispenses with another, and contains weak versions of his other two axioms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370724
Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370813
Voting procedures are known to be plagued with a variety of difficulties such as strategic voting, or where a voter is rewarded with a better election outcome by not voting, or where a winning candidate can lose by receiving more support. Once we know that these problems can occur, the next...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370860
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370870
In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370920
This note presents a simple proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem using Saari's [3, 4] "geometry of voting".
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370950
This paper examines the ex ante core of a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information in which state-dependent allocations are required to satisfy incentive compatibility. This restriction on players' strategies in the cooperative game can be interpreted as incomplete contracts or partial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370969
We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. Thomson (1994a), Sönmez (1994), and Moulin (1999) introduce three different resource-monotonicity conditions. In each characterization they derive, the axioms are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371034
Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are "almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371107