We introduce a game in preference form, which consists of a game form and a preference structure, and define preference rationalizability that allows for each player's ex-post preferences over outcomes to depend on opponents' actions. We show that preference rationalizability is invariant to...

An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very...

We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be strategically distinguished in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are...

We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the...

We illustrate the corrosive effect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure of 'market confidence' defined as approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses. Small probability...

In conventional epistemic analysis of solution concepts in complete information games, complete information is implicitly interpreted to mean common certainty of (i) a mapping from action profiles to outcomes; (ii) players' (unconditional) preferences over outcomes; and (iii) players'...

We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...