establish a causal relationship between competition and investment. Within manufacturing, we show that industry leaders invest … in the late 1990's, which is orthogonal to demand shocks in the 2000's, predicts higher industry investment given Q …. Finally, we provide some evidence that the increase in concentration can be explained by increasing regulations …

We analyze private fixed investment in the U.S. over the past 30 years. We show that investment is weak relative to … two broad categories of explanations: theories that predict low investment because of low Q, and theories that predict low … investment despite high Q. We argue that the data does not support the first category, and we focus on the second one. We use …

We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences. In a model where the … costs of earnings management are endogenous, we show that in equilibrium, bad managers hire and invest too much in order to … systematically followed by large increases in reported frauds. We then show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire …

experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Reg. NMS, and provides some guidance for optimal regulations …

scale nor technological costs can explain the decline in the Q- elasticity of entry, but lobbying and regulations can. We … reconcile conflicting results in the literature and show that regulations drive down the entry and growth of small firms … relative to large ones, particularly in industries with high lobbying expenditures. We conclude that lobbying and regulations …